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THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
l. INTRODUCTION 
583 
Over the span of a century and a half many legal rules and concepts 
evolve and unfold in response to variant social conditions and as a 
means of restructuring social activity. Frequently a legal doctrine as 
presently understood and applied bears little relation, and may even be 
inapposite, to its germinal case.1 The original contours of a legal concept 
may, therefore, often be of small practical import in its current application. 
This general thesis is not applicable, however, to the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity - that principle which provides that a recognized foreign 
sovereign is not susceptible, without its consent, to the judicial process 
of the courts in any other state. Although more than one hundred and 
fifty years old, the case vivifying this legal concept, The Schooner Ex-
change v. M cFaddon,2 is still repeatedly referred to in judicial opinions.3 
Significantly, it is cited not for purposes of distinction or historical per-
spective, but rather, is employed as a present underpinning for the concept 
of sovereign immunity, even though the political and social circumstances 
of today differ considerably from those existing in 1812. 
Subsequent cases, however, while often justifying the conclusions 
reached by references to Marshall's discussion in The Schooner Exchange, 
have intertwined into the concept of sovereign immunity notions distinct 
from Chief Justice Marshall's rationale. Hence the present status of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity is not the end product of, or even a 
stage in, the development of a freely evolving legal concept. Instead 
it is an amalgam of several distinct notions.4 
As a prelude to a discussion of the concept of sovereign immunity 
it will be helpful to initially sketch certain distinctions so that the concept's 
historical development may be better understood. Two basic theories of 
sovereign immunity have struggled for ascendency in the cases and in 
the discourse of commentators. Traditionally, sovereign immunity has 
been regarded as either absolute or restrictive. The former notion is the 
simpler of the two. Under the absolute theory the sole inquiry is whether 
or not the entity being sued is a foreign sovereign. If so, the court will 
1. For a concise demonstration of this proposition in the instance of the develop-
ment of the doctrine of the manufacturer's liability for defective products see E. LEVI, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-27 (1948) ; H. BERMAN & w. GREINER, 
THE NATURE AND FuNCTIONS oF LAw 400-72 (2d ed. 1966). 
2. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
3. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Generale Abastecimiestos y Transportes, 
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Harris & Co. Adver-
tizing v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) ; Chemical Natural 
Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 ( 1966), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1967) . 
. 4. See Collins, The Effectiveness of The Restrictive Theory of Sovereig11 Im-
mumty, 4 COLUM. }. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 119, 120-25 (1965). 
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dismiss the action. 5 The restrictive theory is a refinement of the absolute 
theory. Not only must the defendant be a foreign sovereign, but the 
sovereign must also be acting in its public capacity and not its private 
capacity.6 These two formulations represent the basic approaches to 
delineating the substantive content of the doctrine. 
It is also appropriate to note the fact that an entirely distinct ques-
tion may arise. In what situations will a court be ousted of its juris-
diction to try a claim of sovereign immunity? The resolution of this 
question lies in a consideration of the constitutional ramifications of the 
interrelationship of the judiciary and the executive's control of foreign 
affairs. 
This Comment will trace the historical development of the two 
substantive theories of sovereign immunity, and analyze the case law 
that has developed. 7 The second point of departure will be the inter-
relationship between the judiciary and the executive, with special empha-
sis on whether the executive can have any effect on the judicial formula-
tion of the substantive doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
II. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. The Schooner Exchange 
The initial theoretical base of the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
was articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange 
v. McFadden. 8 In July of 1811 a French naval vessel, The Balaou No.5, 
entered Philadelphia harbor by reason of some distress. During the 
pendency of repairs a libel was filed against the ship in the federal dis-
trict court. Two United States citizens who claimed to be the owners 
of a schooner named The Exchange contended that their vessel had been 
seized on the high seas by the French Navy, armed, and renamed The 
Balaou No. 5. It was the prayer of the petitioners that they be restored 
to the rightful possession of their vessel. A "suggestion"9 that the attach-
5. See C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 308 (3d ed. 1948). For additional 
discussion see Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of foreign 
States, in 28 BRIT. Y.B. lNT'L L. 220, 221-26 (1951); Fensterwald, Sovere1gn Im-
munity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REv. 614, 616-20 (1950). 
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 69 (1965); Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the State Depart-
metn to Philip P. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 
(1952); Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. 
}. INT'L L. 93 (1953). . 
7. There is a distinction drawn in the cases between immunity from jurisdtction 
and immunity from execution. However, no discussion of immunity from execution of 
judgments will be attempted. Nor will the distinction be drawn between cases in 
which an effective plea of sovereign immunity prevents the court from acquiring 
in personam jurisdiction and those in which the court is merely prevented from 
exercising its already acquired jurisdiction over property within the territory. 
8. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
9. A "suggestion" is the formal means by which the executive branch of the 
Government, through the State Department or other agency, makes a representation 
to the court. It is communicated to the Attorney General who instructs the local 
United States Attorney to make the appropriate representation to the court. See Feller, 
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ment of the ship be dissolved and that the suit be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction was filed by the United States Attorney. Marshall, however, 
addressed himself to the pertinent legal considerations, and the Court 
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action. 
The theoretical basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity asserted 
in this opinion is a fusion of two components. The conclusion represents 
an exercise of syllogistic reasoning concerning the practices of nations; 
this is conjoined with an inductive demonstration that the demands of 
the comity of nations, or international law, require recognition and appli-
cation of the sovereign immunity concept. The Court, reasoning from the 
unarticulated premise of upar non habet in parem imperium,"10 concluded 
that any forum state's authority within its territory must be absolute 
and plenary, and that this authority admitted of no extrinsic limitation. 
If restrictions on the sovereign's authority originated externally, a con-
comitant diminution of the sovereign's plenary power would result, and 
there would necessarily be state inequality. The assumed maxim would 
thus be contradicted, since the state imposing restraints on another 
would, by this very fact, exercise authority over the latter. The premise 
requires that all exemptions from the sovereign's absolute power must 
come from within, from the consent of the sovereign state itself.U 
The Chief Justice then proceeded to demonstrate the factual applica-
tion of this abstract conclusion. He enumerated three spheres of interna-
tional relations in which the nation states have voluntarily and for their 
mutual self-advantage ceded a portion of their inherent and absolute 
authority. In these enumerated areas the states forbear from the exercise 
of judicial power. Insofar as the customary practices of the nation 
states comprise the corpus of international law, these concessions of au-
thority may be said to derive their force from international law. The 
Court enumerated, as the final sphere12 in which the sovereign is under-
stood to cede a portion of its territorial jurisdiction, the rights of foreign 
military forces in transit across the territory of another sovereign. As-
suming that the sovereign of the place of crossing has granted generally, 
or in a specific instance, the right of free passage across its territory, 
it is presumed that the state has waived jurisdiction over the force during 
the passage. Thus, the consent to allow passage through the territory 
implies an immunity not expressly stated - the freedom from the juris-
diction of the local sovereign. If the military force commences transit 
without a general or specific authorization, no such presumption of 
immunity arises. Such a qualification proceeds necessarily from the local 
sovereign's right and duty to protect its territory. Addressing itself to the 
Procedure in Cases Involving Immunity of Foreign States in Courts of the United 
States, 25 AM.]. INT'L L. 83, 86 (1931). 
10. "An equal has no authority over an equal." Marshall's opinion is, in a sense, 
a specific application of this principle. 
11. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136. 
12. I d. at 139. The other two areas of ceded authority discussed are the exemption 
from judicial process of the sovereign himself and his diplomatic ministers while. 
in the territory of another state. I d. at 137-39. 
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case at bar, an armed public vessel in a domestic port, the Court applied, 
by analogy, this third exception. There is no inordinate threat of harm 
occasioned by the admission of a ship of war into a port of another state. 
Thus, the Court concluded that if the port is open to ships of all nations, 
an armed public vessel may enter and obtain the protection of the local 
sovereign, and the immunity from jurisdiction, although no specific license 
to enter is granted.1a 
The foundation of these concessions is the common consent of the 
nation states and their coequal dignity. 
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another ; and being 
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the 
dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights 
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a 
foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence 
that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, 
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will 
be extended to him.14 
Apparently Chief Justice Marshall was cognizant that this cession 
of authority, compelled as it was by the necessity of intercourse among 
states and the coequal dignity of the nations, formed a precept of interna-
tional law. This is evidenced by his assertion that the immunity of an 
armed ship of a foreign sovereign "seems ... to be a principle of public 
law."16 Although the sovereign is capable of destroying the implication 
of this ceded authority, the presumption that he has not breached his 
implicit compact with the other nation states lies until some unequivocal 
action to the contrary is taken. It therefore appears that in the absence 
of affirmative action by the executive department to vitiate the cession 
of jurisdictional authority, the courts in the United States must apply 
this concept of sovereign immunity as a part of the federal common 
law, for those customary practices of nation states which form a part 
of international law are incorporated into the constitutional concept of 
"the supreme Law of the Land."16 
13. Id. at 141-44. 
14. !d. at 137. 
15. !d. at 145. Hackworth in a passage reiterating much of Marshall's thought 
states: 
These exemptions ... are theoretically based upon the consent, express or implied, 
of the local state, upon the principle of equality of states in the eyes of interna-
tional law, and upon the necessity of yielding the local jurisdiction in these 
respects as an indispensable factor in the conduct of friendly intercourse between 
members of the family of nations. While it is sometimes stated that they are 
based upon international comity or courtesy, and while they doubtless find their 
origin therein, they may now be said to be based upon generally accepted custom 
and usage, i.e., international law. 
2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST oF INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (1941). One recent com-
mentator has stated: "Sovereign immunity is perhaps the best example of a rule of 
international law derived from the demands of 'comity' among supposedly friendly 
nations." Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition 
of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper? 48 CoRNELL L.Q. 461, 469 (1963). 
16. U.S. CaNST. art. VI, § 2. See The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922); 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
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The opinion in The Schooner Exchange is considered the classic state-
ment of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity.17 However, the 
fundamental distinction between the activities of a sovereign in its public 
capacity as opposed to those undertaken in a private capacity, the basis 
of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, was evidenced in the 
opinion: "A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, 
may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial 
jurisdiction; he may be considered as so far laying down the prince, 
and assuming the character of a private individual. ... "18 Further, the 
conduct of the French naval forces that formed the factual setting of 
this opinion would have been exempted from judicial process under either 
the absolute or restrictive theories of sovereign immunity, since the 
conduct at issue could in no sense be termed as commercial in nature.19 
It might be more accurate to maintain that, although the rationale of 
The Schooner E.1:change had its foundation in the comity among states 
and their coequal dignity, the actual holding of the case is somewhat 
equivocal as to the exact scope of the doctrine. It is also significant that 
the Court considered the merits of the defendant's claim after the 
executive had filed a suggestion of immunity. 
B. Early Case Law 
For more than a hundred years following The Schooner Exchange 
the vast majority of the cases involving a possible plea of sovereign 
immunity were suits in admiralty.20 Ships of foreign nations were libeled 
in American ports, and jurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem was thereby 
established. The opinions in these cases are weighted with references to 
The Schooner Exchange. Immunity was generally granted to those ships 
in the actual possession of a foreign government and employed for a 
17. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 573 (1926); Ocean Transp. 
Co. v. Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967). See Fensterwald, 
Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. Rtv. 614, 617-18 (1950). 
18. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145. It was thus very consistent for Marshall to assert 
twelve years after The Schooner Exchange: 
[W]hen a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it devests [sic] 
itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign charac-
ter, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company 
its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom 
it associates itself .... 
Bank of United States v. Planters Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824). 
19. This action might be considered to be an act of expropriation or nationaliza-
tion. The State Department has in fact suggested immunity for an act of nationaliza-
tion. Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 
A.2d 864 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1967). 
20. Cases did arise outside the admiralty area. See Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. 
United States of Mexico, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924) (the plaintiff was not permitted 
to sue the defendant for its unlawful confiscation of the plaintiff's property). Although 
a plea of sovereign immunity was raised, the court determined that the rights of 
the parties were determined by treaty provisions. In French Republic v. Board of 
Supervisors, 200 Ky. 18, 252 S.W. 124 (1923), the right of the French Republic 
to be exempted from state tobacco taxes was considered. 
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public purpose.21 Mere governmental ownership of the vessel, without 
allegation of public use and possession, was, however, held to be 
insufficient. 22 
A significant number of these cases arose during World War I, and 
the exigencies of the political situation demanded an expansion of the 
doctrine's range of application. Due to the necessity of supplying war 
material and other essentials during this critical period it was imperative 
that the ships employed for this purpose be free from attachment and 
sale in tort and breach of contract actions. 
A resultant shift in emphasis to possession and purpose occurred which 
decidedly broadened the doctrine's scope beyond the three enumerated 
spheres of ceded authority which Marshall demonstrated. Thus the 
international law foundation of the doctrine was expanded to encompass 
current national practice.23 
An interesting refinement took place in the case of The Roseric.24 
A privately owned vessel requisitioned for use by the British Navy was 
held to be immune from jurisdiction so long as she was used for a public 
purpose - this despite the fact that her officers and crew remained in 
the employ of the vessel's private owners.25 In commenting on its expan-
sion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court stated: "The privilege 
was based on the idea that the sovereign's property devoted to state 
purposes is free and exempt from all judicial process to enforce private 
claims. Such idea is as cogently applicable to an unarmed vessel employed 
by the sovereign in the public service as it is to one of his battleships."26 
By assuming that the foundation of the decision in The Schooner Exchange 
was the employment of the property for a public purpose the court was 
able to distinguish the factual situation before it from that portion of 
Marshall's opinion wherein he determined that private ships need not 
be accorded the same exemption as public, armed vessels.27 It is not the 
ownership or the exclusive possession of the property by the sovereign, 
asserted the court, but rather "its appropriation ... to such [public] 
21. The Carlo Poma, 259 F. 369 (2d Cir. 1919) ; The Attualita, 238 F. 909 (4th 
Cir. 1916) ; The Pampa, 245 F. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917). 
22. Long v. The Tampico, 16 F. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); accord, The Beaton 
Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946); The Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 258 (D. 
Mass. 1941). 
23. The Attualita, 238 F. 909 (4th Cir. 1916); The Maipo, 252 F. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 
1918) ; The Pampa, 245 F. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917). 
24. 254 F. 154 (D.N.]. 1918). 
25. On quite similar facts the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hold 
as immune from suit a vessel owned by the Italian government in The Attualita, 
238 F. 909 (4th Cir. 1916). The court held that the ship was not in the actual 
possession of the Italian government on the basis that the owners remained in 
possession and in effect chartered the ship to the government. See Societa Com-
merciale ltaliana di Navigazione v. Maru Nav. Co., 280 F. 334 (4th Cir. 1922) ; 
The Luigi, 230 F. 493 (E.D. Pa. 1916) ; Riesenfeld, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign 
Vessels in Anglo-American Law: The Evolution of a Legal Doctrine, 25 MINN. L. 
Rl\v. 1 (1940). 
26. 254 F. at 158. 
27. Id. at 157. 
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service, that exempts it from judicial process."28 However, The Schooner 
Exchange rested more properly on the sovereign character of the actor 
and the state's responsibility to other sovereigns, rather than on notions 
of public use. This isolation of the public purpose rationale for a rule 
of decision in The Roseric will be seen to have important ramifications. 
In the same year as The Roseric, 1918, The Maipo29 was decided. 
A vessel engaged in an admittedly commercial enterprise was libeled,110 
notwithstanding the allegation that the vessel was a transport of the 
Chilean Navy. As framed by the court, the issue was whether the 
ship, despite its commercial pursuit, ought to be exempted from judicial 
process if owned by another sovereign. In contradistinction to the holding 
in The Roseric, the court considered as the determining factor in The 
Schooner Exchange the notion that property of a sovereign owned in its 
sovereign capacity and in its possession is immune from judicial pro-
ceedings.81 Its interpretation of The Schooner Exchange is apparently 
based on the logical assumption that since Marshall stated that all property 
held by the sovereign in a private capacity is not exempted, then he must 
by necessary implication have intended that all property held in a public 
capacity is immune from judicial process.32 The court did not overtly 
find that The Schooner Exchange called for immunity of all vessels 
engaged in a public purpose as did the court in The Roseric. Nevertheless, 
it determined that immunity should be granted to this ship despite its 
commercial activity since the economic enterprise in which it was engaged 
was of a benefit to the entire population of the state.33 The holding in 
this case may, therefore, be considered as a specific application of the 
public purpose rationale of The Roseric, notwithstanding the difference in 
conceptual approach. Such an interpretation may indicate that war time 
exigencies demanded an expansion of the public purpose concept to en-
compass activities normally considered as commercial. Alternatively, it 
may be construed as limiting the judicial inquiry to only the question of 
ownership, and, once it is determined that the owner is in a sovereign 
state, immunity attaches, even if the activity is commercial in nature. 
This latter view is supported by the court's statement that in consideration 
of the existing war conditions " [ i] t is not to be presumed ... that ... 
our own government, will fail to do what is just and fair in connection 
28. /d. at 161-62. 
29. 252 F. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). 
30. The vessel was libeled to provide quasi in rem jurisdiction for a suit brought 
by the libellants for damage to a cargo of hides which the ship was transporting. 
It is interesting to note that although The Maipo was owned by the Chilean Navy and 
manned by naval personnel, it was in fact chartered to the libellants. 
31. /d. at 629. 
32. This is not a necessary logical conclusion. If a system is composed of only 
A's and B's, the fact that all B's are also C's does not compel the conclusion that no 
A's are C's. 
33. 252 F. at 630-31. This statement illustrates one difficulty encountered by 
adherents to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Even commercial acts 
when engaged in by a government manifest a public purpose, since they are entered 
into for the good of the state. 
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with operations of a commercial character."34 Whichever of these two 
positions is accepted, it appears that the desire to protect American inter-
ests through the expectation of reciprocal treatment provided the incentive 
for expansion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
The early cases proved to be flexible in meeting the demands of 
changing and varying circumstances. However, subsequent conflicting 
threads can be traced to these cases. 
C. Berizzi: Establishment of the Absolute Theory 
Following World War I the Supreme Court decidedly broadened the 
prior concepts of sovereign immunity. In Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro35 
the Supreme Court effectively adopted the absolute theory of sovereign 
immunity. A vessel, The Pesaro, was libeled to provide the jurisdictional 
basis for a breach of contract action. As stated by the Court, the issue to 
be decided was identical to that in The Maipo: whether a ship, engaged 
in the purely commercial venture of transporting merchandise for hire, 
should be grant·ed immunity because it was owned and possessed by a 
sovereign state, the Italian government. For resolution of this question 
Mr. Justice Van Devanter relied upon The Schooner Exchange: 
\Ve think the principles [of The Schooner Exchange] are ap-
plicable alike to all ships held and used by a government for a public 
purpose, and that when, for the purpose of advancing the trade of 
its people or providing revenue for its treasury, government acquires, 
mans and operates ships in the carrying trade, they are public ships 
in the same sense that war ships are. We know of no international 
usage which regards the maintenance and advancement of the eco-
nomic welfare of a people in time of peace as any less a public 
purpose than the maintenance and training of a naval force.36 
This approach is precisely the reverse of that employed by Judge Mack 
in the lower court opinion wherein the claim of sovereign immunity was 
disallowed. 
[T] he immunity of a public ship should depend primarily not upon 
her ownership but upon the nature of the service in which she is 
engaged and the purpose for which she is employed .... 
. . . [I]mmunity should not be given vessels owned and employed 
by the government in ordinary times in the usual channels of trade.37 
In this latter opinion Judge Mack succinctly applied a restrictive approach 
to the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In contrast, Mr. 
Justice Van Devanter in the Supreme Court opinion demonstrated a definite 
34. 252 F. at 631. 
35. 271 u.s. 562 (1926). 
36. !d. at 574. 
37. The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). This same thought is expressed 
again in the opinion: "[A] government ship should not be immune from seizure as 
.such, but only by reason of the nature of the service in which she is engaged." !d. at 482. 
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adherence to, and application of, the absolute theory of sovereign 
immunity.38 Hence a determination of the character of the actor becomes 
the paramount consideration. Once the actor is found to be a sovereign 
state, the distinction between governmental functions and commercial 
activities is meaningless.39 All its activities should be exempted from 
judicial process. Inasmuch as the decision in Berizzi Bros. is grounded 
on, and purports to be an expansion of, The Schooner Exchange doctrine, 
it too must be founded on international law. 
However, even if the distinction between public and private purpose, 
which forms the basis of the restrictive theory, were to be acknowledged, 
the Berizzi Court stripped this distinction of its reality by adopting an 
expansive interpretation of the public purpose test of The Roseric. All 
activities of a sovereign, including its ownership of property, were charac-
terized as public in nature since they were directed toward the public good. 
Therefore, the concept of public purpose subsumes what some had argued 
to be private activity. 
D. The Stone Trilogy and the Foreign Affairs Power 
A little more than a decade after Berizzi Bros. was decided, the 
Supreme Court, in three decisions authored by Mr. Justice Stone, 
effectively interjected a new aspect into the concept of sovereign im-
munity that was distinct from that of The Schooner Exchange. In the 
first of the Stone trilogy, Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, 
S.A. v. The Navemar,40 the alleged owner of a Spanish merchant ship, 
The N avemar, filed a libel in the federal district court to recover pos-
session of the ship. After the State Department refused to request im-
munity, a suggestion of immunity was submitted to the court by the 
Spanish Ambassador. It was asserted therein that the vessel was the 
public property of the Spanish Republic and was therefore exempted 
from the procedure of the court. There are, declared Mr. Justice Stone, 
two methods by which a foreign state may assert the public status of 
property and its attending immunity from judicial process. It may make a 
diplomatic representation of the public ownership of the property to the 
State Department, or it may intervene in the suit as a claimant to the 
property.41 Should the foreign state elect the former procedure, then 
" [ i] f the claim is recognized and allowed by the executive branch of 
the government, it is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel 
38. The adoption of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity was in contra-
vention of State Department policy. In answer to the Italian Ambassador's diplomatic 
request for immunity, the State Department took the position that government-owned 
vessels engaged in commerce were not entitled to immunity. 2 G. HACKWORTH, 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 434 (1941). 
39. See Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court .. 
67 HARV. L. REv. 608, 609 (1954). 
40. 303 u.s. 68 (1938). 
41. See E:r parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921). The Restatement position is in 
accord. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES§ 71 (1965). 
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upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General. ... "42 Alternatively, 
if the foreign state determines to appear as a claimant in the suit and 
does not make a diplomatic representation to the State Department or if 
the State Department has refused to "recognize and allow" the claim, 
"the want of admiralty jurisdiction because of the alleged public status 
of the vessel ... [is an] appropriate [subject] for judicial inquiry upon 
proof of the matters alleged."43 Should this latter procedure be followed,· 
the foreign state must prove factually that the "vessel . . . [is] in its pos-
session and service. . . · ."44 Such a requirement of factual proof is an 
advance from the position of the courts in some of the earlier admiralty 
cases such as The Carlo Poma45 and The Rogday.46 In these cases the 
suggestion, or allegation of public possession and use, which the· foreign 
diplomatic representative made to the court, was itself held to be con-
clusive proof of the facts alleged.47 
Of more decided import is the declaration of a new basis for the 
allowance of a claim of sovereign immunity. The issue of sovereign 
immunity is, by the holding in The Navemar, both a political and a judicial 
question. If the issue is presented politically through a representation 
made to the State Department by the foreign nation and a "recognition 
and allowance" of the claim by that organ of the executive branch is pre-
sented to the court, it must be given cognizance. The effect of the sug-
gestion is to oust the court of jurisdiction. If, instead, the matter is put 
at issue through an appearance by the foreign state in the suit, then the 
court will determine the efficacy of the plea in accord with accepted legal 
precedent. It is noteworthy that the interjection of the political aspect 
by the court in The Navemar does not affect the theoretical legal basis 
of sovereign immunity. The opinion assumes that the State Department 
42. 303 U.S. at 74. Justice Stone apparently relied on the following language 
in The Schooner Exhange: "[T]here seems to be a necessity for admitting that the 
fact [of immunity] might be disclosed to the court by the suggestion of the attorney 
for the United States." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 147. This statement lends little sup-
port to his proposition. The origin of his concept is more accurately derived from 
a passage in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). 
[Q]uestions ... which ... might involve war and peace, must be primarily 
dealt with by those departments of this government which had the power to 
adjust them. . . . In such cases the judicial department of the government 
follows the action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by 
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction. 
ld. at 209. 
43. 303 U.S. at 75. The decision of the Court was that the Spanish government 
should be permitted to intervene in the cases as an actual suitor and present its 
claim of actual possession and public use in that capacity. In the proceeding below 
she intervened but not as an actual party. 18 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1937). In 
Ex parte .Muir, the British Ambassador was not permitted to claim sovereign im-
munity in an amici curiae capacity. Sovereign immunity could be claimed only by 
a party. To the same effect is the Supreme Court decision in The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 
216 (1921), an earlier case involving the same facts as Berizzi Bros v. The Pesaro, 
271 u.s. 562 (1926). 
44. 303 U.S. at 74. 
45. 259 F. 369 (2d Cir. 1919), rev'd on other grounds, 255 U.S. 219 (1921). 
46. 279 F. 130 (N.D. Cal. 1920). 
47 .. It .sh?uld b~ noted that even if t~e factual evidence of state ownership and 
possess.wn IS msuffic1ent to meet the reqmrements for a successful plea of sovereign 
1mmumty, the state may very well prove a superior title on the merits. 
SPRING 1968] COMMENTS 593 
will make a determination in accord with the traditional norms. Thus 
the courts merely substitute a factual determination made by the executive 
branch for their own. 
Ex parte Republic of Peru48 provided Mr. Justice Stone with the 
opportunity to reaffirm the concepts of The Navemar and to further 
explicate their underlying basis. A Cuban corporation libeled the vessel 
Ucayali for the failure of its owner, a corporate agent of the Peruvian 
government, to comply with the terms of a contract. Following the pro-
cedural requirements of The Navemar, the Peruvian government sought 
and obtained a suggestion of sovereign immunity from the State Depart-
ment. Apparently the State Department determined itself bound by the 
Supreme Court's adoption of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity in 
Berizzi Bros., for prior to that case the State Department had not readily 
granted a suggestion of immunity when the foreign government was 
engaged in purely commercial transactions.49 
Justice Stone again asserted that in the absence of a State Depart-
ment recognition and allowance of immunity the courts have the pre-
rogative to determine themselves whether the requisite conditions for 
a plea of sovereign immunity have been satisfied.50 However, when, 
as in the case at bar, the State Department has made the determination, 
the courts are bound to conform themselves to a principle of substantive 
law: 
That principle is that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction, 
by the seizure and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign, as 
to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting 
foreign relations. "In such cases the judicial department ... follows 
the action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by 
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction" .... More specifically, the 
judicial seizure of the vessel of a friendly sovereign state is so serious 
a challenge to its dignity, and may so affect our friendly relations 
with it, that the courts are required to accept and follow . . . [that] 
determination .... 51 
Although The Schooner Exchange is cited by Justice Stone as support 
for this general proposition, there appears to be no dirett reference to 
the concept of a separation of powers and the exclusive executive control 
over the conduct of foreign affairs. Concededly, Chief Justice Marshall 
did grant immunity to and relinquish jurisdiction over the Balaou No. 5 
in an instance where a suggestion was filed, but he did so out of com-
pliance with the dictates of the comity of nations and international law 
48. 318 u.s. 578 (1943). 
49. See The Attualita, 238 F. 909 (4th Cir. 1916); G. HACKWORTH, DIC~ST OF 
INT~RNATIONAL LAW 423-36 (1941). 
50. 318 U.S. at 588. 
51. Id. The quotation of the Court is from United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 
196, 209 (1882). 
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as he judicially found them and not through the constitutional compul-
sion of the doctrine of separation of powers.52 
In The N avemar and Peru the Supreme Court enunciated a new 
theoretical basis for the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
parallel to that stated in The Schooner Exchange. When an executive 
determination to recognize and allow the plea of sovereign immunity has 
been made by the State Department, the courts are required to give it 
conclusive effect. But when no suggestion has been sought from the 
executive branch, or if a request is rejected by it, the courts may, under 
the rationale of The Schooner Exchange, as sanctioned by both The 
Navemar and Peru, determine for themselves the efficacy of the plea 
of sovereign immunity. Both of these opinions allow a conclusive factual 
determination to be made by the executive branch, one that precludes 
an independent determination by the judiciary. It is presumed that the 
State Department will utilize in its factfinding process the same standards 
that are used by the courts. Thus the theoretical basis of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity is not changed. As a matter of substantive law the 
doctrine is still governed by precepts of international law. In effect, the 
separation of powers and exclusive executive department control of 
foreign affairs arguments, as stated in both The Navemar and Peru, 
may be characterized as jurisdictional in nature. An executive factual 
determination ousts the courts of their jurisdiction to decide the question 
of sovereign immunity. 
In the last of the three Stone opinions, Republic of Mexico v. 
Hoffman, 53 the distinction between the political and judicial functions in the 
formulation and application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as put 
forth in The Navemar and Peru, was severely reoriented. An attempt 
was also made to supplant it with an alternative theoretical basis. 
The vessel Baja California was libeled to provide the jurisdictional 
base for a maritime tort action. The Mexican Ambassador filed a sug-
gestion with the court that the ship was owned by the Mexican govern-
ment. Though a representation was made to the State Department, no 
suggestion of "recognition and allowance" of immunity was issued. The 
Mexican government then defended the suit on the merits and attempted 
to use sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense. As presented for 
the Supreme Court's determination the question was whether the mere 
fact that title was vested in a foreign state was, in itself, sufficient 
to allow or require judicial recognition of sovereign immunity. Relying on 
his opinion in Peru, Justice Stone reasserted that in the absence of State 
Department recognition and allowance of sovereign immunity the courts 
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Depart-
ment Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper? 48 
CoRNJlLL L.Q. 461, 469-75 (1963); Frank, The Courts, The State Department and 
National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial Abdication, 44 MINN. L. Rsv. 1101-04, 
1114-19 (1960). 
53. 324 u.s. 30 (1945). 
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may determine whether the requisites for such immunity exist. In this 
opinion, however, Stone declared that such a judicial determination must 
be made in accord with executive policy : 
It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our 
government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new 
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize. . . . 
[R]ecognition by the courts of an immunity upon principles which 
the political department of government has not sanctioned may be 
equally embarrassing to it in securing the protection of our national 
interests .... 54 
In applying this principle to the facts of the case, Stone found that it 
had never been the State Department's policy to recognize sovereign 
immunity on mere assertion by a foreign state of title alone, but only 
on allegations of possession and public use.55 This qualification of the 
former position which Stone put forth in The Navemar and Peru de-
cisions may be somewhat unsound, and it may in fact yield a result 
in direct opposition to that which he intended.56 It forces the court to 
consider past executive policy as the sole source of the substantive metes 
and bounds of the doctrine. For example, if in the past the State Depart-
ment had recognized and allowed a plea of sovereign immunity in a 
particular situation, and yet for extraneous political reasons the Depart-
ment deems it expedient not to issue a recognition and allowance of im-
munity in this individual case, the court would nonetheless be forced 
to recognize and allow the plea of sovereign immunity at the trial on the 
merits; this would be necessitated by an adherence to past executive 
policy to do so under these factual conditions.57 
Conceptually, this qualified position which Stone took in Hoffman 
obliterates the neat distinction between the situations in which a sug-
gestion is interposed by the State Department and instances in which 
no suggestion is filed or requested. It reduces the issue to one of solely 
political concern.58 Hoffman appears to grant to the executive control 
of the substantive doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under the rationale of 
The Navemar and Peru it was assumed that the determination of the 
54. ld. at 35-36. In a footnote the Court indicated its displeasure with the 
decision in Berizzi Bros. wherein the Court upheld a plea of sovereign immunity despite 
the refusal of the State Department to issue a suggestion. 
55. Id. at 38. 
56. The rationale did work properly on the particular facts of Hoffman. It had 
never been the State Department's policy to grant sovereign immunity on a mere 
assertion of title, but only in cases of public use and possession. 
57. Such a situation would be the precise reverse of Berizzi Bros. 
58. Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 
HARV. L. REv. 608 (1954). 
Whether a defendant is entitled to immunity as a sovereign depends on the 
resolution of two issues: ( 1) is it considered a sovereign government? and {2) 
will the interests of foreign relations be furthered by relieving it from responding 
in court? . . . [N] either of these issues is a question of law to be left to the 
courts for decision. 
ld. at 614. See Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions? 40 
AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946). 
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State Department would be in accord with the accepted legal norms ;59 
however, this literal reading of Hoffman reverses that presumption. Now 
the judicial determination is merely one of fact which must be made in 
light of the executive's substantive interpretation of the doctrine. 
The lower courts have not considered themselves bound by such an 
interpretation of Hoffman. Instead, they have refused to go beyond the 
Peru position, and they assert that in the absence of State Department 
action they may determine the effectiveness of a plea of sovereign im-
munity in accord with traditional legal principles.60 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in Hoffman lends credence to this more 
restrictive reading of the opinion. 
It is my view ... that courts should not disclaim jurisdiction which 
otherwise belongs to them .... except when "the department of the 
government charged with the conduct of our foreign relations," or 
of course Congress, explicitly asserts that the proper conduct of these 
relations calls for judicial abstention.61 
Such a statement indicates judicial disfavor for total executive or political 
control of the substantive doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
It is significant that in the recent authoritative treatment of the 
question of sovereign immunity, the Restatement (Second) of Foreign 
Relations Law, the H ofjman qualification - that sovereign immunity is 
exclusively a political question to be determined by the executive branch -
applies only when the issue is raised diplomatically through a representa-
tion to the State Department. Section 72 provides: 
( 1) [A] suggestion [of immunity] from the executive branch of 
the government ... is conclusive as to issues determined by executive 
action within the exclusive constitutional competence of the executive 
branch . . . and as to other issues directly affecting the conduct 
of foreign relations. As to all other issues, such a suggestion will 
be given great weight. 
(2) [A]n objection made by the government of a foreign state 
through its accredited diplomatic representative ... raises an issue for 
disposition by the court or other enforcing agency upon the basis 
of proo£. 62 
Mr. Justice Stone's three opinions have had marked effect on the 
current status of the doctrine. He created the distinction between what 
has been characterized as the jurisdictional or political aspects of the 
doctrine and its substantive content. The Navemar and Peru were his 
59. In The Navemar the State Department granted immunity to commercial 
activity relying on the Supreme Court's adoption of the absolute theory of sovereign 
immunity in Berizzi Bros. 
60. E.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 
1952); United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 5i7 (1944). 
61. 324 U.S. at 41--42. 
62. RESTATllMENT (SECOND) oF FoREIGN RllLATIONS LAw oF THE UNITED STATllS 
§ 72 (1965) (emphasis added). 
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vehicles for this. Subsequently, however, he merged these two aspects 
in the Hoffman case. Despite this final turn, the Hoffman qualification has 
been largely disregarded. The courts have felt free to determine, in the 
absence of a State Department suggestion, the existence vel non of the 
requisites for an effective plea of sovereign immunity, and this determina-
tion has been made in accord with traditional legal precedent, not executive 
policy. Since 1952, however, this distinction between the substantive basis 
of the doctrine and its jurisdictional aspects has taken on a marked sig-
nificance. It serves as a basis for an analysis of the cases decided after 
the issuance of the Tate Letter. 
III. THE TATE LETTER - PRESENT CoNFusiON 
In 1952 the Acting Legal Advisor to the State Department, Mr. Jack 
B. Tate, in a letter directed to the Attorney General,63 articulated an 
official State Department position on sovereign immunity: "[I]t will 
hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity .... "64 Such a declaration was based on the familiar 
objections to the absolute theory: ( 1) it is anomalous and unfair to ex-
empt a foreign sovereign state from responsibility for its actions when 
most governments have consented to allow themselve•s to be sued in their 
domestic courts under provisions similiar to the Federal Tort Claims Act65 
and the Tucker Act ;66 (2) the absolute necessity of governmental 
commercial activity makes it equally imperative that persons who engage 
in such transactions with governments have available to them forums in 
which causes of action arising from such transactions might be adjudi-
cated.67 
Near the conclusion of this letter Mr. Tate asserted: 
It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive· cannot control 
the courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea 
of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do so. 
There have been indications that at least some Justices of the Supreme 
Court feel that in this matter courts should follow the branch of the 
Government charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign 
relations.68 
This enigmatic paragraph embodies, and is in part responsible for, the 
current difficulties in the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Several possible interpretations may be assigned to it which essentially 
embody the distinctions made in the prior Supreme Court cases. 
63. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). 
64. Id. at 985. 
65. 28 u.s.c. § 1346 ( 1964). 
66. 28 u.s.c. § 1496 (1964). 
67. See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Lauter-
pacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immtmities of Foreign States, in 28 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT'L L. 220 (1951). 
68. 26 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 985 (1952). 
598 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VoL. 13 
Conceivably this statement by Mr. Tate may express a State Depart-
ment view that the courts are not bound in any manner by its suggestions. 
Under such a reading not only would a court be free to disregard a State 
Department suggestion, but it would also sanction the judicial practice of 
making independent determination of the present legal scope of the doc-
trine. It is evident that such an interpretation would be contrary to the 
position of The Navemar, Peru, and the Restatement that a court is ousted 
of jurisdiction by a suggestion. Also, this interpretation would imply 
an affirmation of the absolute theory of Berizzi Bros. Mr. Tate quite 
apparently did not intend this construction, for it reduces the Tate Letter 
to an exercise in futility. 
Directly opposed to this first construction is the reading of the 
Tate Letter which in fact approaches the Hoffman position. Not only 
must a court give conclusive effect to a State Department suggestion when 
one is issued, but even when the question is presented judicially the 
court must, in considering the efficacy of the plea, be guided by executive 
policy. Under this reading, in the absence of a suggestion, there is room 
for a legal determination of the fact. However, the scope of the legal 
doctrine would be guided by executive policy - i.e., the content of the 
doctrine would be solely one of political concern. 
Such an interpretation has a vital flaw if the literal language of the 
letter were carried to its logical conclusion, and may result in a finding 
by a court that the court need not follow present State Department policy. 
After reading the second sentence of the quoted paragraph in conjunction 
with the Hoffman decision a court may feel constrained to defer to the 
State Department's past policy of adherence to the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity, even in the absence of a suggestion from the execu-
tive branch. However, if the court were to carry its analysis one step 
further it would find itself in a circular line of reasoning. After deferring 
to the executive as Hoffman would require, the court may conclude from 
the first sentence of the quoted passage that it is not the State Department 
policy to require compliance. The court, therefore, would reach the posi-
tion that it would not be bound by the executive's declared policy, and 
it would decide the question of sovereign immunity according to prior 
precedent. This is equivalent to the result under the first interpretation. 
Presumably, most courts would not take this last step. hut instead would 
confine themselves to the Hoffman position. 
The final construction of the Tate Letter is essentially that expressed 
in section 72 of the Restatement. When the State Department has sug-
gested immunity, it is conclusive upon the courts. If no suggestion is 
sought by the foreign state, or if the State Department has refused to 
honor the request, the issue, if presented to the court, is to be determined 
in accord with prevailing international law. This latter situation is identical 
to the construction employed in the first reading of the passage, although 
limited to cases in which no suggestion is filed by the State Department. 
There is no executive control over the substantive contours of the doctrine. 
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If the executive has issued a suggestion it is unimportant to determine 
whether the court's deference to the State Department is on a political level 
or is but an acceptance of the restrictive theory, because in those instances 
where the State Department applies the restrictive theory, a fortiori the 
sovereign would qualify under the absolute theory. 
In light of such ambiguous, or virtually nonexistent guidelines, it 
is understandable that the courts differ on the effect to be given a sug-
gestion of immunity which is granted by the State Department in accord 
with the policy of the Tate Letter. In the only Supreme Court decision 
which has discussed the doctrine since the issuance of the Tate Letter, 
National City Bank v. Republic of China,69 Mr. Justice Frankfurter enun-
ciated a detailed criticism of the absolute theory; however, he wrote 
only one sentence, and that guardedly neutral, on the Tate Letter: "Re-
cently the State Department has pronounced broadly against recognizing 
sovereign immunity for the commercial operations of a foreign govern-
ment."70 Obviously, no guidance can be gleaned from this reference by 
the Supreme Court. Therefore the courts, in the absence of any definitive 
criteria, have taken diverse positions. 
In several cases, such as Frazier v. Hanover Bank71 and Stephen v. 
Zivnostenska Banka,12 the New York courts have seemingly adopted the 
first reading of the Tate Letter in instances where suggestions were 
presented. Both of these cases essentially involved disputed claims to 
assets held in New York banks. The courts did not give a conclusive 
effect to the State Department suggestions. Rather they proceeded to 
factually determine if the suit did involve a claim against a sovereign.73 
This approach is not firmly supported by a close reading of the Tate 
Letter. The thrust of the letter pertains to instances in which a suggestion 
is not issued. No implication is apparent that would call for a position 
contrary to that of The NavemM and Peru- that a court is always bound 
when a suggestion is issued. 
In numerous other decisions the courts have given a broad and 
conclusive effect to the State Department suggestions of immunity. Once 
they are issued, the suit must be dismissed.74 Possibly the circuit court 
69. 348 u.s. 356 (1955). 
70. ld. at 361. 
71. 204 Misc. 922, 119 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 861, 119 
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1953). 
72. 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 781, 235 
N.Y.S.2d 1, 186 N.E.2d 676 (1962). 
73. In the Frazier case the court found that the claims to the funds were in effect 
claims against a sovereign and allowed a plea of immunity. In the Stephen case 
immunity was not granted to the Czechoslovakian government. In commenting on 
what he deems to be the lamentable judicial deference to State Department sugges-
tions, Mr. Justice Musmanno, dissenting in Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. 
Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966), cert. dmicd, 385 U.S. 822 
(1967), stated: "The majority Opinion in this case is built on an erroneous concept 
of the law, namely, that once the State Department whispers sovereign immunity 
the Courts must close their doors to everyone who may come within the breeze of the 
zephyric suggestion." !d. at 178--79, 215 A.2d at 886. 
74. Ocean Transp. Co. v. Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 
1967); United States v. Anchor Line, Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Rich 
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opinion in Rich v. Nwiera Vacuba, S.A.15 exemplifies the most extreme 
judicial deference to the State Department's political determination. In 
a suit containing a great many collateral and purely judicial matters, 
including an alleged waiver of sovereign immunity, the court dismissed 
the suit with the remark that "our Constitution requires us to assume 
that all pertinent considerations have been taken into account by the 
Secretary of State."76 Such a statement strongly affirms an adherence to 
the position that a suggestion is always binding when issued by the 
executive. 
In situations where no suggestion is issued, the second reading of 
the Tate Letter, the Hoffman approach, and the third reading, the 
Restatement view, are both pertinent. Under the latter, in the absence 
of a suggestion the court could apply the existing absolute theory of 
Berizzi Bros. However, under the Hoffman approach the court would have 
to take cognizance of the State Department's adoption of the restrictive 
theory and would premise its judicial determination on that theory. The 
application of the absolute theory presents relatively few problems, but 
the courts face a difficult task in determining what is or is not a com-
mercial act under the State Department's restrictive theory. A brief over-
view of the cases is indicative of this difficulty. 
Originally the Department's position was quite narrow and evinced 
an overly zealous adherence to the literal language of the Tate Letter. In 
New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea,71 one of the 
plaintiff's ships was unloading rice in the harbor of Pusan, Korea, as 
per a contract of transportation entered into by the plaintiff and defendant. 
One of the Korean government's small tenders, while assisting in this 
operation, collided with the plaintiff's vessel. The Korean government did 
not intend commercial sale of the cargo, rather it distributed the rice to 
feed the civilian and military population during the Korean crisis. Nat-
withstanding this factual setting, the State Department refused to recog-
nize the Korean government's claim of immunity. 
In many cases a factual situation is presented which would fall 
outside the restrictive theory; nevertheless, in several more recent cases 
the State Department has felt compelled by the pressures of political 
considerations to issue a suggestion of immunity. In looking to these 
decisions the courts find themselves trying to reconcile opposed positions 
- the Tate Letter's adherence to the restrictive theory and the issuance 
of a suggestion in a particular case. 
v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d 
24 (4th Cir. 1961) ; State v. Dekla, 137 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) ; 
Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 
(1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1967). 
75. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). 
76. 295 F.2d at 26. 
77. 132 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1956). Jurisdiction 
was acquired by attaching Korean assets in a New York bank. 
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In Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela78 
the plaintiff attached a ship belonging to the defendant that was engaged 
in commercial activity. On the basis of the jurisdiction thus acquired, 
he sued the defendant for breach of contract alleging unilateral cancella-
tion of concessions, breach of a construction contract, and illegal nationali-
zation of property. The Pennsylvania supreme court determined, despite 
a vigorous dissent by Justice Musmanno, that conclusive effect must be 
given to the suggestion of immunity issued by the State Department.79 
Rich v. N aviera Vacuba, S.A.80 presented similar political exigencies. A 
Cuban merchant ship bound from Cuba to Russia with a cargo of sugar 
turned into a Virginia port, whereupon several members of the crew 
sought asylum. The ship was libeled to satisfy outstanding judgments 
against the original owners of the vessel ; these same owners also brought 
a libel in an attempt to regain its possession. Although the ship was en-
gaged in a purely commercial venture, the State Department acceded to the 
Castro regime's protestation of immunity. Consequently, the court de-
termined itself to be conclusively bound by the suggestion of immunity 
issued by the executive. Such cases present little difficulty in themselves. 
Under either the second or third interpretation of the Tate Letter, the 
courts are undeniably bound by the suggestion since it emanates from the 
foreign relations power. The problem presented by such cases is the lack 
of discernible criteria which they offer to a court which feels itself bound 
by the Hoffman interpretation of the Tate Letter. At present it is not pos-
sible for a court to discern precisely what the executive policy is. 
Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y 
Transportes81 provides the only attempt at a judicial solution of this 
dilemma. In this Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion Judge Smith, 
in the absence of a suggestion, adopted the Hoffman approach and at-
tempted to implement the restrictive theory by delineating the difference 
between governmental and commercial acts. A rather conservative ap-
proach was adopted in that sovereign immunity need only be granted by 
a court if the activities are : 
( 1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien, 
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization, 
( 3) acts concerning the armed forces, 
78. 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1967). 
79. Concededly the State Department may have issued a suggestion of immunity 
in this case in an attempt to thwart application of the Hickenlooper Amendment, 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88--633, Part III, ch. 1, § 301, 78 Stat. 
1009, which would have enabled the court to consider if the nationalization or expro-
priation was in violation of international law despite the Supreme Court decision in 
Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). For a discussion of the 
interrelation between the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity see American 
Hawaiian Ventures, Inc. v. M.V.J. Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622 (D.N.]. 1966); 
Note, The Castro Govemment i11 American Courts: Sovereign Immunity and The 
Act of State Doctrine, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1607 (1962). 
80. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), a/J'd per ettriam, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). 
81. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). 
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( 4) acts concerning diplomatic activity, 
( 5) public loans. 82 
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Such a set of criteria exempts only those acts which are strictly political. 
It would have authorized a grant of immunity in the Chemical Natural 
Resources case because a nationalization of property was the root issue, 
but conceivably not in Rich. 
IV. CoNcLUSION 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to chronicle the evolution of 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the past one hundred and fifty years. 
Its theoretical basis and structural limits were first set forth in The 
Schooner Exchange. In the subsequent admiralty cases the scope of 
application was decidedly expanded, but Marshall's rationale was employed 
to justify the enlargement. The Navemar and Peru superimposed the con-
cept of separation of powers and the correlative duty to accept an execu-
tive request for immunity. Then, in Hoffman, Mr. Justice Stone at-
tempted to supplant the traditional basis by characterizing the doctrine 
as an instrument of foreign affairs, and, therefore, within the exclusive 
control of the executive. Whatever certainty and predictability that 
existed under this case law was obfuscated by the issuance of the Tate 
Letter in 1952. As indicated above, the Tate Letter can be read in at 
least three different ways, and it is impossible to determine whether it rep-
resents a retreat from, or an affirmation of, Hoffman. If it is the latter, 
the implementation of the Hoffman approach is exceedingly difficult be-
cause the executive has not delineated the substantive criteria of its 
policy and apparently departs from the restrictive theory when political 
considerations are found to be controlling. 
The fairest synthesis of the doctrine is found in section 72 of the 
Restatement. When a suggestion is issued by the executive it must be 
accepted by the judiciary. This preserves the constitutional principles of 
The Navemar and Peru. Contrariwise, in the absence of a suggestion, 
the courts act as factfinders and apply the substantive rule of sovereign 
immunity as it has developed judicially. By omission, the Restatement 
rejects the implications of Hoffman that the executive policy should con-
trol the substantive principles. It should be noted that the absolute 
theory of immunity, as understood by the courts, includes the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity, and that, therefore, embarrassment to the 
executive seems limited to those situations where the State Department, 
pursuant to the restrictive theory, refuses to issue a suggestion and the 
courts subsequently grant immunity. Moreover, it is difficult to under-
stand how a nation experiences embarrassment by acknowledging the 
integrity of the rule of law as applied by its courts. 
82. ld. at 360. 
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Throughout this rather abstract discussion of the absolute and re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity, the pragmatic interests of the 
private party plaintiff have been given only passing consideration. Since 
the absolute theory of sovereign immunity subsumes the restrictive and 
grants to a foreign nation an even greater measure of protection, there 
can be little diplomatic or political embarrassment to our government con-
sequent to its application by our courts. Thus, any determination to recast 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity will probably be based on considera-
tions of fairness and justice to the private plaintiff.83 Those same pres-
sures which impelled enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the 
Tucker Act may force a more definitive articulation of a plaintiff's rights. 
Two possible procedures might be utilized. Treaties may be entered into 
which more precisely detail the rights of citizens of one contracting 
party to sue the other nation state.84 Alternatively, a congressional enact-
ment such as the Hickenlooper Amendment85 might be employed to de-
lineate the precise scope of the sovereign immunity doctrine in American 
courts. 
Daniel T. Murphy 
83. See Cardozo, Sovereig11 Imnumity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 
67 HARV. L. REV. 608 (1954). 
84. Treaty of Commerce, Friendship and Navigation with the Republic of Ireland, 
Jan. 21, 1950, art. 15 [1950] 1 U.S.T. 1859, T.I.A.S. No. 2155. 
85. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88--633, Part III, ch. 1, § 301, 
78 Stat. 1009. 
